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Abstract 
 
Using the data from the China Household Income Project (CHIP) in 2002, 2007, and 2013, this 
chapter examines the effects of a series of social policy reforms on the economic distance 
between the rich and poor in each of the urban, rural, and migrant household sectors. We find 
that over the years pensions in the urban areas consistently helped narrow the economic distance 
among urban households, whereas other social benefits—including health insurance, social 
assistance, supplementary income, and in-kind benefits—had little or no redistributive impact. 
Both rural and migrant social benefits changed from being regressive in 2002 to becoming 
progressive in 2013. Among all social benefits in the rural areas in 2013, supplementary income 
and in-kind benefits in the form of agricultural and livelihood subsidies played the most 
significant redistributive role, while private transfers also helped to substantially narrow 
economic distances. Among migrants, in 2013 health benefits and taxes and fees helped narrow 
economic distances, although to a lesser extent as compared to the rural social benefits. Despite 
the expansion of social policy during this period, in both urban and rural China market forces 
still played a dominant role in widening the economic distance between the rich and poor, which 
trumped the redistributive effects of the social benefits. These results suggest that China’s future 
social policy reforms face continued challenges in terms of unifying the urban-rural-migrant 
imbalances and keeping pace with the disequalizing market forces.  
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I. Introduction 
 
The Chinese government has launched a series of social policy reforms during the past fifteen 
years that aim to provide basic social protection to its citizens and to unify the long-segregated 
social benefit systems across the urban-rural divide. Part of the reason for the expansion of social 
policy reforms has been China’s rapidly rising income inequality in China that surpasses 
conventional alarm levels and threatens political stability and social harmony, both of which are 
high on the agenda of the ruling Communist Party. China’s national Gini coefficient rose from 
0.44 in 2000 to 0.49 in 2008, and then declined somewhat to 0.47 in 2012, but China remained 
among the most unequal third of all countries (Li and Sicular 2014; Ravallion and Chen 2007). 
The fast-growing number of Internet and social media users during this period also helped 
expose the widening income gaps and the imbalances in social benefits enjoyed by various 
groups, promoting awareness and demand for greater social protection among Chinese citizens.  
To address these challenges and shift away from focusing solely on economic growth, the 
Chinese government launched significant social policy reforms that expanded its social insurance 
and social assistance programs to extend coverage from urban employees to urban non-
employees, rural residents, and, to some extent, rural-to-urban migrants. In 2006 the government 
implemented an extensive campaign to “Build a New Socialist Countryside” based on a series of 
initiatives to improve the livelihood of rural residents. Enactment of the 2008 Labor Contract 
Law required that all employers sign labor contracts with employees and provide social 
insurance coverage for employees, including migrant workers.  
How successful was this series of social policy reforms in redistributing resources and 
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narrowing the economic distance between the rich and poor? Existing studies have examined the 
redistributive effects of selected social benefits, but they have not examined the complete set of 
social benefits in its entirety. In addition, most existing studies rely on the widely used Gini 
coefficient to capture the redistributive effects of the social benefits on the overall income 
distribution. However, none of the studies have focused specifically on the economic distance 
between the rich and the poor, the two ends of the income distribution that are often most 
sensitive to the receipt of social benefit.  
In this chapter, we use data from the China Household Income Project (CHIP) surveys in 
2002, 2007, and 2013 s to investigate how the social policy reforms affected the economic 
distance between the rich and poor during the 2002–2013 period. We address this research 
question separately within the respective urban, rural, and migrant samples to better understand 
the different effects of these social policy changes on the various populations. Chapter 10 in this 
volume by Cai and Yue uses data from the CHIP 2013 survey to investigate the redistributive 
effects of social security expenditures in the national context, whereas Chapter 5 by Hoken and 
Sato utilize all five waves of the CHIP data to examine the effects of public policy on trends in 
long-term inequality in rural China.  
In this chapter, we use an innovative and revealing method to examine the economic 
distance between low- and high-income households within the urban, rural, and migrant 
populations to shed more light on aspects of the income distribution that are beyond the overall 
level of inequality as captured by the Gini coefficient. Our findings, supplementing evidence 
based on analyses of selected social benefits that use on the Gini measure, suggest important 
policy implications as China continues its social reforms and expansions.  
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II. Social Policy Reforms and their Redistributive Effects: 2002–2013 
 
Scholars largely agree that the social policy reforms during the 2002–2013 period represent a 
significant expansion and shift in the policy direction from focusing on economic growth to 
focusing social development (Besharov and Baehler 2013; Carrillo and Duckett 2011; Leung and 
Xu 2015; Liu and Sun 2015; Ngok and Chan 2015; Saich 2008, 2015; Shue and Wong 2007). 
Duckett (2012) characterizes these reforms as a compromise between the social and economic 
agendas, whereas Frazier (2014) emphasizes the role of urbanization in driving the unification of 
the urban-rural social benefit systems. This literature, however, also points out the persistent 
urban-rural-migrant disparities in terms of social provisions and benefit levels and the gaps 
across employees and non-employees in the urban areas. Empirical evidence based on the 2002–
2007 CHIP data suggests that social policy reforms during this period moved in the direction 
progressivity, but the urban-rural gaps remained substantial and migrants continued to be left 
behind in terms of social protection (Gao, Yang, and Li 2013). 
First, during this period a comprehensive social insurance system began to take shape, 
with significant expansions of pensions and health insurance to urban non-employees, rural 
residents, and migrants. Specifically, the urban pension system gradually moved from covering 
only civil servants and employees of public institutions and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to a 
dual system of social pooling (i.e., earnings-based and pay-as-you-go) and individual accounts 
(with mandatory individual contributions). In 2012, a nationwide urban resident pension system, 
funded by both government subsidies and individual contributions, was established for urban 
non-employees. A New Rural Social Pension System (NRSPS) was launched in 2009 to provide 
pension coverage for rural residents. It also offered a national framework to allow participation 
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by migrant workers. This system was fully funded (in the central and western regions) or half- 
funded (in the eastern region) by the central government and a highly subsidized personal 
savings account. In 2014, the rural and urban pension systems were unified to allow equal access 
and equal quality of pension systems for urban and rural residents and to facilitate rural-urban 
mobility. Nevertheless, average benefit levels for urban non-employees and rural residents 
remained very low and varied substantially across localities, whereas urban employees received 
pension benefits in accordance with their job positions and ranks (Dorfman, Oltzmann, and 
O’Keefe 2012; Leung and Xu 2015; Liu and Sun 2016). 
Another major development in the social insurance system was the expansion of health 
insurance. In particular, the Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI) was expanded 
from covering only employees and retirees with urban hukou to covering migrant workers (Hu 
and Ljungwall 2013). The Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI, with significantly 
lower premiums and benefits than those of the UEBMI (Fang 2014; Ministry of Health 2010) 
was implemented nationwide in 2010 to provide health coverage for urban non-employees, 
including children, older adults who were ineligible for the UEBMI, and the poor and disabled.  
The New Rural Cooperative Medical System (NRCMS) was introduced in 2002 and 
implemented nationwide in 2008.  Heavily subsidized by the central and local governments, it is 
a voluntary health insurance program for rural residents, with low premiums and benefits (Barber 
and Yao 2010; Fang 2014). By 2013, the coverage rate of the NRCMS reached 98.7 percent of 
the country and covered 802 million participants (Guojia weisheng jishengwei guihua yu xinxisi 
2014).  
Wang and his colleagues (Wang 2013; Wang, Long, Jiang, and Xu 2016), using survey 
data from 2012, have examined the redistributive effects of social insurance programs. They 
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found that social insurance income lowered the Gini coefficient overall by 6.4 percent. This 
social insurance income included pensions, health, maternity, work injury, and unemployment 
insurance. However, the redistributive effects differed greatly for the urban-rural-migrant 
populations: social insurance helped reduce the urban Gini coefficient by 12 percent, the rural 
Gini coefficient by 3 percent, and the migrant Gini coefficient by only 0.1 percent. Pensions 
contributed the most to income redistribution, lowering the Gini coefficient by 5.88 percent. 
Much of this reduction (5.30 percent) was due to the pensions for urban employees and retirees, 
whereas the pensions for urban non-employees and rural residents had minimal effects 
(reductions in the Gini coefficient by 0.24 percent and 0.32 percent, respectively). Health 
insurance lowered the Gini coefficient by 0.49 percent, with 0.27 percent, 0.20 percent, and 0.02 
percent respectively due to the NRCMS, UEBMI, and URBMI. Maternity, work injuries, and 
unemployment insurance together helped reduce the overall Gini coefficient by only 0.04 
percent.  
Second, this period also saw the establishment and expansion of a comprehensive social 
assistance system. The centerpiece of this system, the Minimum Livelihood Guarantee, or dibao, 
was initially established in cities in 1999 but it was expanded significantly during 2001–2002. It 
was further expanded to the rural areas in 2007. Meanwhile, the government also launched a 
series of supplementary social assistance programs to offer extra support to needy families and to 
integrate the traditional “three withouts” (sanwu, i.e., those without income, without a working 
ability, or without a legal guardian in the urban areas) and the “five guarantees” (wubao, i.e.,  
guarantees to provide food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and burial services for rural residents 
who have no working ability or income source) programs into this system. These include 
medical, education, and housing assistance as well as temporary assistance to provide subsidies 
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and service referrals for individuals and families facing urgent or extreme difficulties (Gao 2017; 
Liu 2010).  
Using data from the 2007 CHIP survey, Li and Yang (2009) found that the urban dibao 
had a very small impact on reducing income inequality, lowering the overall Gini coefficient by 
only 0.46 percent and the ratio between the average income of the highest and lowest income 
deciles by only 3.19 percent. A growing number of recent studies on the rural dibao have focused 
on its targeting performance and its anti-poverty effectiveness (Golan, Sicular, and Umapathi 
2017; Han, Gao, and Xu 2016; Han and Xu 2013, 2014; Liu and Xu 2016), but none of these 
studies have examined its impact on income inequality. Given the small size of the dibao 
benefits, it is reasonable to speculate a similar small impact on inequality in the case of the urban 
dibao.  
Using data from the 2009 China Health and Nutrition Survey, Lu and his colleagues (Lu, 
Lin, Vikse, and Huang 2013) investigated how pensions and social assistance affected income 
inequality. They found that pensions substantially helped lower the Gini coefficient (by 0.0595), 
whereas social assistance, including the dibao and disability subsidies, only lowered the Gini 
coefficient by 0.0046. However, pensions were distributed regressively, helping raise the ratio of 
those in the top-quintile income to those in the bottom-quintile income from 15.99 to 17.60. 
Social assistance also helped reduce this ratio from 15.99 to 14.80. In addition, the authors, in 
examination of in-kind subsidies that were mostly employment-based (e.g., assistance for food, 
gas, coal, electricity, and childcare), found that in-kind subsidies played a small but positive role 
in reducing overall income inequality and in narrowing the top-bottom income gap. Chapter 10 
in this volume by Cai and Yue uses the CHIP 2013 data to examine the redistributive effects of 
public transfers in the national context. They find that the formal sector pension benefits and the 
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medical expense reimbursements were disequalizing, whereas the dibao benefits and rural 
pensions were equalizing.  
Third, in addition to expanding social insurance and social assistance, the government 
launched a major campaign to Build a New Socialist Countryside through a series of initiatives 
to narrow the urban-rural gap and to improve the livelihood of rural residents. These initiatives 
included the abolition of agricultural taxes, the elimination of tuition and fees for rural 
compulsory education, increased investments for rural infrastructure, and the provision of direct 
subsidies to support the production and welfare of farmers (Fock and Wong 2008; Frazier 2014; 
Lardy 2012; Lin and Wong 2012; Wallace 2014; World Bank 2007). Based on an analysis of all 
five waves of the CHIP data, Chapter 5 in this volume by Hoken and Sato finds substantial 
improvements in the redistributive and poverty impacts of public transfers in the rural areas, 
signifying a historic reversal in the long-term urban-biased public policy in contemporary China.  
Two other studies have examined the redistributive effects of specific components of 
these policies in rural China. Lin and Wong (2012) focus on direct subsidies to farmers, which 
include subsidies for farmland production, social welfare, and public services (e.g., pensions, 
health, education, and dibao), and subsidies for living condition. Using administrative data 
during from 2003 to 2009 published by the various Chinese commissions and ministries as well 
as in the China Statistical Yearbooks, they found that over time these subsidies played an 
increasingly larger role in narrowing the urban-rural income gap. However, their analysis of a 
2005 Ministry of Agriculture survey dataset reveals these subsidies to have a strikingly 
regressive effect, with higher-income households, households with a Party member, and 
households in richer regions reaping greater benefits than others from these subsidies.  
Using the CHIP 2002 and 2007 data, Li and Sicular (2014) focus on the redistributive 
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effects of the abolition of agricultural taxes. They find the average tax rate paid by rural 
households decreased from 2.8 percent in 2002 to 0.3 percent in 2007, suggesting that the 
abolition of agricultural taxes and fees had positive distributional effects. They also find that this 
policy change was particularly beneficial to low-income groups, with the average tax rate for 
those in the lowest income decile decreasing from 6.2 percent in 2002 to 0.3 percent in 2007, 
whereas the average tax rate for those in the highest income decile declined from 1.5 percent to 
0.4 percent during the same period. However, they found this policy to have virtually no effect 
on overall income inequality in the rural areas.  
Fourth, the government also made efforts to improve labor conditions for migrant 
workers. The 2008 Labor Contract Law required that employers sign labor contracts with 
employees and provide them with social insurance coverage.  These stipulations were most 
beneficial to migrant workers, by improving labor conditions and increasing the subjective well-
being of migrant workers, since previously they were largely ineligible for such protection 
(Cheng, Smyth, and Guo 2015; Gallagher, Giles, Park, and Wang 2015; Gao, Yang, and Li 2012, 
2016; Li and Freeman 2015). Luo and Sicular (2013) use the CHIP 2002 and 2007 data to find 
that income from migrant employment contributed to robust economic growth in rural 
households and helped to reduce income inequality and narrow the urban-rural income gap. 
Because of this law, migrant workers were more likely to sign labor contracts, receive higher 
wages, and enroll in pension, health, work injury, and unemployment insurance.  
In summary, existing evidence shows that social insurance—especially pensions—played 
a dominant role in reducing income inequality during this period, whereas social assistance had a 
negligible effect in narrowing inequality gaps. Both the campaign to Build a New Socialist 
Countryside and the efforts to support migrants helped improve the living conditions of rural 
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residents and migrants and to reduce income inequality. Building on this body of literature, in 
this chapter we use the CHIP 2002, 2007, and 2013 data to offer new evidence on the effects of 
these social policy reforms on the economic distance between the rich and the poor among each 
of the urban, rural, and migrant populations during the 2002–2013 period. We hypothesize that 
social insurance, particularly pensions, played the most prominent role in narrowing the 
economic distance between the rich and poor, whereas social assistance played only a minimal 
role. We also hypothesize that the economic distances among the rural and migrant samples were 
reduced due to the social policy reforms that aimed to increase living standards, especially 
among the most vulnerable population groups.  
 
III. Data and Methods 
A. CHIP Data 
This study uses the three recent waves of CHIP data, which collected information regarding 
family income, consumption, and demographics for 2002, 2007, and 2013. The CHIP samples 
were drawn from the larger National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) samples using a multistage 
stratified probability method to achieve national representativeness. For the 2002 and 2007 
waves, the households were drawn from lists of households with official local urban or rural 
hukou to form the respective urban and rural samples. The urban and rural questionnaires were 
designed to capture the different income sources and structures of the two groups. However, as 
urbanization and migration accelerated, relying on the hukou as the sampling criterion was no 
longer feasible or accurate. At the end of 2012, the NBS launched its first national household 
survey using a unified sampling frame, income definition, and questionnaire. The sampling was 
stratified by province and based on information from the 2010 census. The sample households in 
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the 2013 CHIP survey were selected from the NBS sample using a multistage stratified 
probability method.  
In addition to the urban and rural samples, the 2002 CHIP for the first time included a 
subsurvey of 2,000 migrant households, with the sample conveniently drawn from the same 
cities as those included in the urban survey. The 2007 CHIP used a more systematic approach 
and intentionally chose the cities most populated by migrant families to be part of the migrant 
sample, yielding a sample size of 5,000 households from fifteen cities. In the unified 2013 CHIP 
national sample, rural residents constituted the rural sample, urban residents with an urban hukou 
constituted the urban sample, and urban residents with a rural hukou constituted the migrant 
sample. Because migrants were not intentionally sampled, their sample size was quite small (957 
households) in 2013. Such a small sample size raises concerns about its representativeness, even 
though we applied statistical weights to render the results more representative. Because the 
migrant samples in different years were collected using different sampling techniques, the 
migrant samples may not be comparable over time. These concerns are beyond the scope of this 
chapter, but need to be kept in mind when interpreting the results and drawing policy 
implications. The analyses in this chapter are based on analysis of the separate, mutually 
exclusive urban, rural, and migrant samples. Table 11.1 presents the CHIP sample sizes for the 
three years that are examined in this study.  
[Table 11.1 about here] 
As noted above, to make the results based on the CHIP samples nationally representative, 
the CHIP team constructed sampling weights for each wave, taking into consideration the 
distribution of the population among the urban-rural-migrant subgroups and among the eastern-
central-western regions. All analyses in this chapter apply these weights so that the results can be 
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considered nationally representative for each of the urban-rural-migrant subgroups. The CHIP 
team also constructed 3-level weights that took into consideration the distribution of provincial-
level populations. Since this chapter does not address provincial-level income distribution, we 
chose not to apply the 3-level weights.  
 
B. Measuring Social Benefits and their Effects on Economic Distance 
Taking advantage of the detailed income measures available in the CHIP data, we define 
household final income as the sum of market income, social benefit income, and private 
transfers, minus taxes, fees, and payments for social insurance contributions.1 Market income 
includes wage income, net business income, property income, and rental value of owner-
occupied housing. Social benefits include pensions, health insurance, unemployment insurance, 
supplementary income, social assistance, housing, food, and other in-kind benefits.2 The 
inclusion of these various cash and in-kind benefits enables us to provide a comprehensive 
examination of the recent social policy changes as reflected at the household level. In addition, 
private transfers include remittance income sent back by household members working away from 
the home, elderly support, alimony, and other gifts from family and friends.3 All incomes are 
calculated at the per capita household level and are adjusted by the provincial price deflators 
compiled by Brandt and Holz (2006), which we then updated to 2013.4  
                                                                
1 In some cases, the CHIP questionnaire did not specify whether transfer income was from public or 
private sources; these items are grouped as “other transfer income,” as explained below in the results 
section.  
2 Some of these social benefits are measured differently across the various waves and across the urban, 
rural, and migrant samples. They are explained below in the results section.  
3 Our income measure is largely consistent with the CHIP income measure, as described in Chapter 2, and 
it is broader than the NBS income measure. Compared to the CHIP income measure, our measure, 
including a more detailed list of social benefits, is consistent across waves.  
4 As these provincial price deflators are somewhat outdated, we attempted instead to use the official urban 
and rural CPIs to adjust the prices. The results are not reported here but are very consistent with our main 
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We measure the size of the total social benefits by the percentage of social benefit income 
in the household final income. This measure has the advantage of taking into consideration 
changes in the overall income level over time and gauging the relative contribution of the social 
benefit income. The structure of social benefits is measured by the percentages of specific social 
benefits in the household final income.  
We compare the economic distances at the bottom (i.e., the 10th percentile) and at the top 
(i.e., 90th percentile) of the income distribution between the pre- and post-transfer incomes to 
understand the redistributive nature of the social benefits and to detect whether the 2002–2013 
social policy reforms during were progressive (i.e., supporting the poor) or regressive (i.e., 
favoring the rich). We use eight income definitions to examine how the cumulative inclusion of 
each additional income component changed the economic distance between the rich and the poor 
within the respective urban, rural, and migrant populations. These income definitions are: 1.) 
market income (i.e., pre-transfer, pre-tax income); 2.) plus pensions; 3.) plus health insurance; 4.) 
plus social assistance; 5.) plus supplementary income and in-kind benefits; 6.) plus private 
transfers; 7.) plus other transfers; and 8.) minus taxes and fees (i.e., post-transfer, post-tax 
income). Because these benefits and transfers are added cumulatively, it is important to note that 
the order in which they are added will affect the results. A comparison between the results based 
on the first definition (i.e., market income, or pre-transfer, pre-tax income) and the last definition 
(i.e., final income, or post-transfer, post-tax income) reveals the redistributive effects of the 
entire set of social benefits and transfers.  
Based on each income definition, we identity the 10th, 50th (i.e., median), and 90th 
percentile incomes and use bar charts to capture the economic distance between the rich and poor 
households within the urban, rural, and migrant populations respectively. The bottom end of the                                                                                                                                                                                                               
results.  
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bar has the ratio of the income of the households in 10th percentile relative to the median 
multiplied by 100 (i.e., p10/p50*100). The top end of the bar has the ratio of the income of the 
households in 90th percentile relative to the median multiplied by 100 (i.e., p90/p50*100). The 
length of the bar, reflecting the economic distance between these two ends, is calculated as the 
difference of the two (i.e., p90/p50*100-p10/p50*100). An increase at the lower end of the bar 
and a reduction at the higher end of the bar due to social benefits and transfers indicate 
progressivity, whereas the opposite case reflects regressivity (Gao 2010; Garfinkel, Rainwater, 
and Smeeding 2010). By comparing the lengths of the pre- and post-transfers bars and 
understanding whether the shift occurred at the lower or higher end of the bar, we can understand 
the extent to which the social benefits helped reduce the economic distance between the rich and 
poor and whether the nature of the social benefits was progressive or regressive.  
 
IV. The Size and Structure of the Social Benefits 
 
Before delving into the analysis of the effects of the social benefits on the economic distance, we 
first present the results regarding the changes in the size and structure of the social benefits 
during the 2002–2013 period. As measured by the percentage of social benefit income in the 
household final income, the size of urban social benefits decreased from 2002 to 2013, whereas 
social benefits for rural and migrant families increased because of the social policy reforms that 
aimed to broaden social protection for these groups. However, the urban-rural-migrant gaps 
persisted, with the size of the urban social benefits still substantially larger than the rural and 
migrant social benefits. Across the three groups, pensions dominated the social benefit package, 
with noticeable gains by rural and migrant families in 2013. Rural families also gained transfer 
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income through the Building a New Socialist Countryside initiative.  
[Table 11.2 about here] 
Table 11.2 presents the changes in the size and structure of social benefits for the urban, 
rural, and migrant samples from 2002 to 2013 respectively. For urban families, the share of 
social benefits in household final income on average decreased from 26.92 percent in 2002 to 
20.05 percent in 2007 and then to 17.46 percent in 2013. In all three years, pensions were the 
dominant social benefit for urban families, constituting 14.80 percent of urban household final 
income in 2002 and increasing to 16.97 percent in 2007. But in 2013 pensions declined to 15.61 
percent of urban household final income. This fluctuation reflected the requirement that urban 
employees had to shoulder more pension contributions through the urban employee pension 
system, which included both social pooling and individual accounts. Health benefits, however, 
declined sharply for urban families, from 7.29 percent of the household final income in 2002 to 
1.60 percent in 2007 and 0.45 percent in 2013. This is partly because that our measure of health 
benefits only captures the self-estimated cash value of medical care expenses covered by 
employers or the government and not the value of health insurance coverage that was available 
but not utilized or claimed. Therefore, our estimate of health benefits is an underestimate, 
especially for urban residents who on average had access to much broader coverage than their 
rural and migrant counterparts. Housing benefits also declined sharply from 2.68 percent in 2002 
to about 0.78 percent in the later years, mainly due to the housing privatization that was launched 
in the 1990s and completed shortly after 2002. Other social benefits—including social 
assistance—remained a small proportion of household final income in urban China despite 
policy expansions during this period. 
Unlike the trends for urban residents, however, rural and migrant families both gained 
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significantly from social benefits during this period, especially from 2007 to 2013, as indicated 
by Table 11.2. In 2002 social benefits only accounted for 0.71 percent of rural families’ final 
income, but this figure rose to 2.13 percent in 2007. By 2013 social benefits constituted 6.42 
percent of rural families’ final income, a significant increase from the earlier years due to the 
expansion of social insurance and social assistance as well as the Building a New Socialist 
Countryside initiative. Specifically, pensions increased from 0.58 percent of rural household final 
income in 2002 to 3.59 percent in 2013, a sixfold jump over the eleven-year period. Health 
benefits also increased substantially, from 0.02 percent in 2002 to 0.73 percent in 2013, due to 
implementation of the NRCMS. Social assistance rose from 0.06 percent in 2002 to 0.51 percent 
in 2013, also a significant increase, mainly due to the implementation and expansion of the rural 
dibao since 2007. In 2013, supplementary income in the form of agricultural and livelihood 
subsidies, an income item that was nonexistent in previous years, made up 1.30 percent of rural 
households’ final income.5  
For the migrants, social benefits constituted 2.96 percent of household final income in 
2002.6 However, most of these benefits were employer-provided food and housing, which in 
effect were wages paid in-kind. The same items were included in the wage income for 2007 and 
2013. Social benefits for migrants increased significantly, from 0.57 percent in 2007 to 2.39 
percent in 2013. The biggest boost came from pension income, which increased from 0.02 
percent in 2007 to 1.44 percent in 2013. Other in-kind benefits increased from 0.42 percent in 
2007 to 0.72 percent in 2013.  
Despite the significant gains in social benefits for rural residents and migrants during this 
                                                                
5 The CHIP 2007 rural survey did not ask about specific social benefits. Therefore, for 2007 we are only 
able to estimate the size and redistributive effects of total social benefits in the rural areas but not the 
specific items.  
6 Similarly, the 2002 CHIP migrant survey also did not ask about specific social benefits.  
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period, especially from 2007 to 2013, they still lagged considerably behind the gains of their 
urban peers. In 2013 an average of 17.46 percent of urban families’ household final income came 
from social benefits, but that for rural families was only 6.42 percent and that for migrant 
families a mere 2.39 percent. It is important to note that not only did rural households receive 
social benefits that constituted a much smaller share of their final income than that of their urban 
peers but also their final household income was much lower. Indeed, across the three years, after 
adjusting for consumer price differences the final household income of rural families on average 
remained less than one-half that of urban families. A much smaller share in the amount of final 
household income meant that the value of rural social benefits, as opposed to that of urban social 
benefits, was much smaller. The persistent urban-rural-migrant gap in social benefits indicates 
the continuing challenges to achieving a truly unified and balanced social welfare system in 
China.  
 
V. The Effects of Social Benefits on Economic Distance 
 
We now turn to the effects of social benefits on reducing the economic distance between rich and 
poor families in the urban, rural, and migrant samples respectively. Figure 11.1 presents the 
results for urban China. Overall, we find that market forces played a dominant role in widening 
the economic distance between the rich and poor during the 2002–2013 period, suppressing the 
redistributive effects of the social benefit package as a whole. Among the social benefits, 
pensions consistently helped narrow the economic distance over the years, whereas other social 
benefits—including health insurance, social assistance, supplementary income, and in-kind 
benefits—had little or no redistributive impact despite the recent social policy expansions in 
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these areas.  
[Figure 11.1 about here] 
First and foremost, both the pre- and post-transfer economic distance between the rich 
and poor continued to increase from 2002 to 2013. This was clearly driven by market forces. The 
pre-transfer economic distance between the rich and poor, as measured by the length of the bar, 
increased from 186 in 2002 to 199 in 2007 and 216 in 2013, a 16 percent increase during the 
eleven-year period. The social benefit transfers helped narrow the economic distance somewhat, 
but the post-transfer economic distance continued to rise over time, from 151 in 2002 to 159 in 
2007 and 179 in 2013, a 19 percent increase during this period. These trends suggest that the 
disequalizing force of the market dominated the equalizing role of the social benefits during the 
2002–2013 period in urban China, producing a much more unequal society as measured by the 
economic distance between the rich and poor.  
Second, throughout the period, pensions functioned as the primary equalizing social 
benefit that consistently narrowed the economic distance between the rich and poor in urban 
China. In 2002 pensions reduced the economic distance by 35 (from 186 to 151) as measured by 
the length of the bar. That reduction increased to 37 in 2007 (from 199 to 162) but the increase 
was slightly less in 2013 at 34 (from 216 to 182).  However, the redistributive effects of pensions 
still trumped that of any other social benefits or transfers across all three years. 
In contrast, Cai and Yue’s chapter in this volume finds that urban pension benefits were 
disequalizing rather than equalizing, a finding that is different from the strong and persistent 
redistributive role of urban pensions identified here. This discrepancy may be due to several 
reasons. First, in this chapter the pre-transfer income is market income only, which does not 
include pension benefits. Most retirees belonged to the bottom income groups based on the pre-
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transfer income. The inclusion of pension income lifted the relative positions of retirees and 
narrowed the economic distance between the rich and the poor. Unlike our approach, Cai and 
Yue’s decomposition method focuses on how each income component contributed to overall 
inequality, and pension benefits are treated equally as other income components. Second, this 
may also be because this chapter examines the urban, rural, and migrant populations separately, 
whereas Cai and Yue’s chapter investigates the redistributive effects nationwide.  
Third, all the other social benefits and transfers—including health insurance, social 
assistance (mainly dibao), supplementary income and in-kind benefits, private transfers, and 
other transfers that cannot be designated as public or private, as well as taxes and fees paid—had 
little impact on the economic distance between the rich and poor across all three years, 
suggesting that the social policy reforms and expansions during the 2002–2013 period in these 
areas were not effective in terms of income redistribution. Specifically, in 2002 health insurance 
helped lift the relative positions of the rich (from 199 to 204), mainly because health insurance 
was closely tied to employment status and position, and those with better jobs tended to have 
better health coverage. By 2007 and 2013, health insurance had a minor impact on economic 
distance. In 2002, supplementary income and in-kind benefits helped narrow the economic 
distance somewhat, mainly because the in-kind benefits tended to go to the less advantaged, but 
their redistributive role diminished to become almost non-existent by 2013. None of the other 
benefits or transfers played a noticeable role in changing the economic distance between the rich 
and poor in urban China during the period of this study.  
Figure 11.2 presents the results of the effects of social benefits on the economic distance 
between rich and poor families in rural areas. Rural social benefits were regressive in 2002 but 
they became slightly progressive in 2007 and substantially progressive in 2013. In 2002, social 
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benefits—mainly pensions—helped increase the P10/P50 ratio from 43 to 44, thus lifting the 
relative position of low-income households, but they also raised the relative position of high-
income households, increasing the P90/P50 ratio from 214 to 217. Taxes and fees were also 
regressive in 2002: they lowered the relative position of low-income families by 1 (from 44 to 
43) and raised the relative position of high-income families by 3 (from 218 to 221). In 2007 rural 
social benefits became slightly progressive and shortened the economic distance bar by 1 (from 
180 to 179).  
[Figure 11.2 about here. 
The social policy reforms since 2007 changed the redistributive nature of rural social 
benefits to become substantially progressive by 2013. Overall, social benefits and transfers 
helped narrow the economic distance between rich and poor families from 252 to 206, a 46-point 
reduction, which was larger than the reductions due to urban social benefits in any of the three 
years under study. Among the social benefits, supplementary income and in-kind benefits in the 
form of agricultural and livelihood subsidies played the most significant redistributive role, 
shortening the length of the bar by 7 points. Pensions remained regressive, benefiting the rich 
more than the poor and slightly increasing the economic distance. Health benefits and social 
assistance each helped narrow the economic distance by 2 points. Private transfers had the largest 
redistributive role, narrowing the economic distance by 36 points. Such transfers included 
remittance income sent back by household members working away from home, elderly support, 
alimony, and other gifts from family and friends. It is noteworthy that these private transfers 
played a dominant redistributive role in rural China in 2013, probably as a supplement to the still 
inadequate redistributive role of public transfers.  
Despite the larger redistributive effects of both private and public transfers in 2013 in the 
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rural areas, the post-transfer economic distance (206) was still substantially wider than that in 
earlier years (178 in 2002 and 179 in 2007), suggesting that market forces had become much 
more disequalizing by 2013, a trend that is similar to that in urban China. The pace of social 
policy expansions lagged behind the pace of market forces.   
Figure 11.3 presents the results of the effects of social benefits on economic distances 
among migrants. Similar to the trends in the rural areas, migrant social benefits also changed 
from regressive in 2002 to progressive in 2013, although to a smaller extent as compared to the 
rural social benefits. In 2002 social benefits for migrants helped widen the economic distance 
between rich and poor families from 154 to 162, an eight-point increase. In 2007, social benefits 
played a minimal role in impacting the economic distance, whereas private transfers helped lift 
the relative position of rich families. In 2013 health insurance helped narrow the economic 
distance by 1 point (from 166 to 165), private transfers reduced the economic distance by 2 
points, and taxes and fees further reduced the economic distance by 4 points. Social benefits still 
played a very limited redistributive role, but they did become progressive.  
[Figure 11.3 about here] 
 
VI. Conclusion and Discussion 
 
Using data from the 2002, 2007, and 2013 CHIP surveys, this chapter examines the effects of a 
series of social policy reforms on the economic distance between the rich and poor among urban, 
rural, and migrant families during this period. These social policy reforms included expansion of 
social insurance and social assistance programs to extend coverage from urban employees to 
urban non-employees, rural residents, and migrants, provision of agricultural and livelihood 
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subsidies to rural residents through the Building a New Socialist Countryside initiative, and the 
enactment of the 2008 Labor Contract Law to offer greater social protection to migrant workers. 
We find that pensions in urban areas consistently helped narrow the economic distance 
among urban households over the years, whereas other social benefits—including health 
insurance, social assistance, supplementary income, and in-kind benefits—had little or no 
redistributive impact. Both rural and migrant social benefits changed from regressive in 2002 to 
progressive in 2013. In the rural areas, supplementary income and in-kind benefits, in the form of 
agricultural and livelihood subsidies, played the most significant redistributive role among all 
social benefits in 2013, whereas private transfers also helped narrow the economic distance 
substantially. For migrants, health benefits and taxes and fees helped narrow the economic 
distance in 2013, although to a lesser extent as compared to the rural social benefits.  
Despite the series of social policy expansions during this period, in both urban and rural 
China market forces still played a dominant role in widening the economic distance between the 
rich and poor, which trumped the redistributive effects of the social benefits. These results 
suggest that China’s future social policy reforms will face continued challenges in terms of 
attempting to unify the imbalances in the urban-rural-migrant systems and to keep pace with the 
disequalizing market forces. Urban social benefits remain larger in size, more comprehensive in 
coverage, and they play a consistently larger redistributive role as compared to those for rural 
residents and migrants. It will take strong political will and a serious fiscal commitment to 
address the disparities in social protection among the urban-rural-migrant populations and to 
respect their equal rights.  
Meanwhile, it is alarming that the levels of the pre-transfer income inequality in both 
urban and rural areas continued to rise and that the expanding social benefits were unable to 
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sufficiently curtail this trend. Despite a decline in national inequality from 2007 to 2013, an 
underlying factor being the narrowing of the urban-rural gap, the rising income inequality within 
the respective urban and rural areas is of critical concern and may threaten social stability and 
harmony. Given China’s unique blend of socialist rule and state capitalism, an elevated level of 
income inequality may have more direct and serious political and social consequences in China 
than it does in other countries. This is partly why the government promoted the social policy 
reforms as part of an effort to provide a basic level of social protection and an equalizer across 
the urban-rural boundaries and income groups. The balancing act between economic growth and 
social harmony remains a serious challenge for current and future administrations in China.  
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Table 11.1. Sample sizes of the China Household Income Project (CHIP) survey, by year 
 
 
2002 2007 2013 
Urban     
Households  6,835 10,235 6,762 
Individuals  20,632 30,340 20,414 
Provinces       12      16      15 
Rural    
Households  9,200 13,000 10,456 
Individuals  37,928 51,847 39,869 
Provinces        21      16      15 
Migrants    
Households  2,000 5,000 957 
Individuals  5,318 8,404 2,609 
Provinces      12       9     15 
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Table 11.2. Size and structure of social benefits measured as a percentage of household final 
income (%) 
 
 
Urban  Rural  Migrants 
 
2002 2007 2013  2002 2007 2013  2002 2007 2013 Pensions 14.80 16.97 15.61  0.58  3.59   0.02 1.44 Health 7.29 1.60 0.45  0.02  0.73   0.11 0.07 Unemployment insurance 0.27 0.15          Social assistance 0.53 0.16 0.18  0.06  0.51   0.01 0.02 Supplementary income 0.69  0.12    1.30    0.08 Housing 2.68 0.77 0.79    0.01    0.05 Food 0.54 0.32          Other in-kind 0.13 0.07 0.31  0.05  0.28   0.42 0.72 Total Social Benefits 26.92 20.05 17.46  0.71 2.13 6.42  2.96 0.57 2.39 Notes: Household final income refers to post-transfer, post-tax income. All income and social benefits 
used for calculating these results are measured as household per capita values. 
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Figure 11.1. Impact of social benefits on the economic distance between low- and high-income 
households in urban China  
 
 
Notes: For each income definition, the bottom end of the bar gives the ratio of the household income in 
the 10th percentile relative to the median multiplied by 100 (i.e., p10/p50*100). The top end of the bar 
gives the ratio of the household income in the 90th percentile relative to the median multiplied by 100 
(i.e., p90/p50*100). The length of the bar reflects the economic distance between these two ends and is 
calculated as the difference between the two (i.e., p90/p50*100-p10/p50*100).  
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Figure 11.2. Impact of social benefits on the economic distance between low- and high-income 
households in rural China  
 
 
Notes: For each income definition, the bottom end of the bar gives the ratio of the household income in 
the 10th percentile relative to the median multiplied by 100 (i.e., p10/p50*100). The top end of the bar 
gives the ratio of the household income in the 90th percentile relative to the median multiplied by 100 
(i.e., p90/p50*100). The length of the bar reflects the economic distance between these two ends and is 
calculated as the difference between the two (i.e., p90/p50*100-p10/p50*100).  
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Figure 11.3. Impact of social benefits on the economic distance between low- and high-income 
households among rural-to-urban migrants in China 
 
 
Notes: For each income definition, the bottom end of the bar gives the ratio of the household income in 
the 10th percentile relative to the median multiplied by 100 (i.e., p10/p50*100). The top end of the bar 
gives the ratio of the household income in the 90th percentile relative to the median multiplied by 100 
(i.e., p90/p50*100). The length of the bar reflects the economic distance between these two ends and is 
calculated as the difference between the two (i.e., p90/p50*100-p10/p50*100).  
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